Building the Bridges -- A Proposal for Merging different Paradigms in Mobile NFC Ecosystem by Akram, Raja Naeem et al.
Building the Bridges – A Proposal for Merging
different Paradigms in Mobile NFC Ecosystem.
Raja Naeem Akram
Institute for Informatics & Digital Innovation
Edinburgh Napier University.
Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Email: R.Akram@napier.ac.uk
Konstantinos Markantonakis and Keith Mayes
Information Security Group, Smart Card Centre
Royal Holloway, University of London.
Egham, United Kingdom
Email: {K.Markantonakis, Keith.Mayes}@rhul.ac.uk
Abstract—In late 1990s. the multi-application initiative was put
forward to have multiple applications on a single smart card. This
would have enabled a cardholder to accumulate all of her smart
card based applications (e.g. banking, telecom, and transport
etc.) on a single device. However, despite the initial fervour
for the multi-application smart card initiative; there were no
wide spread adoption of this model. Nevertheless, the Near Field
Communication (NFC) has reinvigorated the multi-application
initiative again. In this paper, we will analyse why the multi-
application smart card initiative failed to materialise a decade
ago and whether this time around it will succeed as a viable
model or not. The NFC trials being conducted basically rely on
the existing ownership architectures, which can create market
segregation and thus reducing the potential revenue generation
capability. We propose a possible approach that avoids market
segregation, increase revenue generation, and provide flexibility,
robustness and scalability to existing ownership architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
From early 1980s to late 2000, the smart card technology
evolved from a monolithic to a multi-application operating
system that can support post-issuance application download
[1]. The multi-application smart card initiative enabled diverse
application to co-exist and share resources in a secure and
reliable manner [2]. It was envisioned that diverse organisa-
tions (e.g. banks, telecom operators and transport, etc.) would
approach each other to provide services on a single device.
This assumption was based on experience of the collaborative
attitude of different stack-holders in the smart card industry
[3]. However, the reality was different.
The multi-application smart card initiative lost its appeal
and it can be attributed to the issues related to the card own-
ership, marketing potential of card surface, customer loyalty,
and potential revenue stream — that hindered any possible
collaboration. In addition to these issues there were other
voices that were concerned with the security implication of
the multi-application smart card initiative [4, 5]. Nevertheless,
the enthusiasm died quickly until a new technology termed as
Near Field Communication (NFC) came on the scene. The
NFC among other capabilities, enables a mobile phone to
emulate as a contact-less smart card [6]. For last few years,
the NFC based mobile services with applications like banking,
telecom and transport are trailed in around 38 countries [7].
In these trials the smart card management architecture is
based on the traditional framework that has been deployed
in the smart card industry since its inception, namely Issuer
Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM) [8]. In the
ICOM, smart cards are issued and controlled by a centralised
authority known as card issuer. Any application provider that
would like to install their application on to these smart cards
need prior-authorisation from the card issuer. The extension
of the ICOM deployed in the NFC based trials is termed as
Trusted Service Manager (TSM) architecture [9]–[11]. The
TSM is an entity that manages the smart card platform
and all application providers need its prior-authorisation for
application installation. The TSM can be a card issuer or a
third party that just manages the platform.
A contrasting approach to the smart card ownership model
is based on the citizen ownership architecture. In this model,
the smart cards are owned by cardholder (user) and they have
the choice to install or delete any application as they require.
The term ownership implies that the cardholders only have the
right to choose an application either to be installed or deleted.
They do not have the control of the smart card platform
such as we have in the ICOM architecture. The security
and reliability of the platform is assured by the platform
itself so the application providers do not have rely on the
trustworthiness of the cardholder [12]. Such an architecture
is termed as User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
(UCOM) [8]. The UCOM provides a dynamic, ubiquitous,
scalable and open environment. Where TSM can be argued
to provide better acceptance in the smart card industry and a
feasible business case.
The theme of this paper is to theoretically illustrate that a
“coopetitive” attitude towards the multi-application smart card
architecture would be beneficial to all stack-holders. The term
coopetitive is borrowed from the discipline of game theory
[13]; where it stands for the concept in which competitors
collaborate with each other to share the common cost and
compete where they see that they might have a competitive
advantage. The coopetitive architecture is a merger of two
ideas: TSM and UCOM. This paper Illustrates that such a
model can increase scalability, and increase revenue generating
opportunities then individually these both models can achieve.
In section two, we discuss what was the underlying causes
that hindered the wide-spread deployment of the multi-
application smart card in the first instance and recently why
there is a renewed interest in this idea. Section three introduces
the TSM architecture and how it can hinder a scalable and
ubiquitous framework. The UCOM architecture is discussed
in section four along with why giving choice to user is a good
idea both with regards to security and business. Section five
provides the rational for having the coopetitive architecture,
which is then detailed in section six. Finally, in section
seven we discuss the future research directions and list the
concluding remarks.
II. MULTI-APPLICATION SMART CARDS
In this section we open the discussion with illustrating the
issues that decelerated the multi-application smart card initiate.
Extending this discussion to show why there is a renewed
interest in this idea after a decade.
A. What Went Wrong?
As traditionally smart cards role is of security nature, the
concept of having multiple applications; where all of them
might not be trusted prompted a debate of what kind of control
should be in place to manage this initiative. As pointed out by
Pierre Girard [14], there can be three possible architectures.
First architecture was based on the traditional centralised
control which was successfully deployed before multi-
application initiative; termed as Issuer Centric Smart Card
Ownership Model (ICOM). In this model, an organisation
(hereafter referred as card issuer in the ICOM) acquire smart
cards from a card manufacturer and then issues them to
individual customers. The application providers that would like
to install their applications to the issued smart card negotiate
terms and conditions with the card issuer. Unless, card issuer
do not authorise an application provider they can not install
their application on to the smart cards. In this model, the user
has no say which application they would like to have it on
their smart cards.
In second approach, customers would take the role of card
issuer and acquire (blank) smart cards from a card manufac-
turer. A customer would then acquires an application from
an organisation (e.g. bank, telecom and transport, etc.) and
install onto her smart card. This approach was not considered a
serious contender as organisations may not trust the customer
and might not have behaviour guarantees of the smart card
platform. Finally, the third approach was to have a certification
authority that manages the multi-application scheme. This
approach can be considered an extension to the ICOM model.
We have a centralised authority that issues the smart cards
but application providers do not have to reach an agreement
with the card issuer. Instead they agree in principle with the
certification authority and download application to smart cards
that are under its management.
As noted by M’Chirgui [3], the smart card industry’s rapid
proliferation was due to the adoption of the coopetition attitude
towards the product and market; as noted for other high-tech
industries. The concept of coopetition can be described as two
individuals (companies) who cooperate with each other to cook
a pie (establish market) and then they compete with each other
to take the biggest share of it. The examples of coopetition
can be EMV [15], GlobalPlatform [16], and Java Card [17]
specification. However, similar attitude was not apparent for
deployment of the multi-application smart card initiative for a
diverse set of reasons. Following are few of the major issues
that contributed to the deceleration of the convergence of
diverse services on a single device - discussed in detail in
[8].
1) Smart Card Control (Ownership).
2) Marketing Potential
3) Customer Loyalty
4) Customer Relationship Management
5) Potential Revenue Source
The above mentioned reasons can be considered to overly
simplifying the dynamics that led to the deceleration of
the multi-application smart card initiative. Nevertheless they
played their role, and recently these issues are coming back
as the concept of having multi-application applications on a
single device is gaining momentum.
B. Renewed Interest!
Similar to the issues that decelerated the multi-application
smart cards; we cannot pin point one single factor that has
reinvigorated the multi-application initiative again. However,
in this section we discuss few of the contributing factors that
has generated a substantial interest in the smart card service
sector.
The most important of all is the Near Field Communication
(NFC) that enables a mobile phone to emulate a contact-
less smart card [18]. This facilitate the NFC enabled mobile
phones to perform contact-less card transaction on existing
smart card infrastructure (i.e, contact-less smart card terminals
[19]). Therefore, it does not require any modification on the
infrastructure side of the smart card service ecosystem. The
only change is that a user’s mobile phone acts as a contact-
less smart card and from terminal’s point of reference it
communicates on a contact-less interface with a device that can
be a traditional smart card or a mobile phone. The NFC trails
are being carried out in 38 countries around the world [7].
Nevertheless, a practical deployments is still in the pipeline.
However, it can be argued that NFC based service of some
sort is going to be role out whether it would be part of the
traditional smart card services or other possibilities.
In addition to the development taking place in terms of
NFC and its implication on the traditional smart card industry.
In a totally unrelated sector the dynamics of business was
substantially reshaped. Here we refer to the concept referred as
the “iPhone effect”. Installing of an application on to a mobile
was possible even before the iPhone came to market. However,
iPhone made it consumer friendly; an average customer can
easily navigate, search, and install third party software [20]. In
addition, the application developers do not have to negotiate
with the mobile operators to download their applications onto
iPhone. Furthermore, Apple has managed to remain in the
sales loop by charging a percentage on application sales
directly to the application developers. Finally, mobile operator
got the opportunity to sell data plans and generate revenue
from the data usage.
With ever growing younger consumer base that use a mobile
phone for multitude of purposes [21]; it is obvious that smart
card service sector could also harness the platform to reduce
their investment (i.e. purchasing of new smart cards), decrease
roll-out time for new services and remain competitive. Ex-
ample of the competitive challenge faced by the traditional
smart card industry can be mobile payment systems; there
are a number of smart phone Apps (i.e. Starbucks Apps for
Blackberry and iPhone, and Paypal App, etc.) that a user can
download onto their mobile phones and then can use them to
pay for different services.
We consider that multi-application smart card initiative has
mature to a level that it can be considered as a secure,
reliable and viable business model. The divergence of different
services on to a single device might be considered a natural
next step in the smart card evolution. However, how successful
this might be is still open for debate. In next section we discuss
the proposed (and trailed) business model for the NFC based
services roll-out.
III. TRUSTED SERVICE MANAGER
The Trusted Service Manager (TSM) can be considered an
extension to the ICOM. In this section, we discuss different
ownership and card management architectures in the TSM en-
vironment, also elaborating on who is driving which initiative.
A. Possible Ownerships Architectures
A Trusted Service Manager (TSM) is an entity that manages
the collaborative architecture in which different application
providers share a platform1. The TSM can be a card issuer
or a third party whom the card management tasks [10] are
being delegated by the scheme participants (e.g. card issuer
and application providers). In current proposals a TSM can
be: a) Mobile Network Operation (MNO) [11, 22], b) Card
Issuing Bank (CIS) [23] or c) A neutral third party.
No matter who takes the role of the TSM in a particular role
out, an ownership architecture has to be decided among the
scheme participants. Some of the possible architectures listed
in the literature [6, 10].
IV. USER CENTRIC SMART CARD OWNERSHIP MODEL
In this section we will briefly introduce the UCOM and then
describe why a discussion on such a model is necessary in the
context of future multi-application smart card initiative(s).
A. Brief Introduction
The architecture of the User Centric Smart Card Ownership
Model (UCOM) supports the smart card ownership to be with
its user. The term ownership does not imply that the cardholder
owns the platform as a card issuer in the ICOM or TSM ar-
chitecture. It implies that the user has the “freedom of choice”
1Platform: The term platform in context of the TSM refers to the secure
elements present in a mobile phone. Secure elements can be Universal
Integrated Circuit(UICC), embedded secure element, and Secure Memory
Card [10].
Figure 1. Generic Overview of User Centric Smart Card Model (UCOM)
[8] to install or delete any application they would require from
their smart cards. The card issuers or application providers in
the ICOM or TSM architecture are termed as Service Providers
in the UCOM. A Service Provider (SP) is an organisation that
will only develop a smart card based application and then
issue its customers with unique credentials to download its
application(s) directly to the respective smart cards [24].
As shown in figure 3, a card issuer acquires a UCOM
supported smart cards referred as User Centric Smart Card
(UCSC) from a card manufacturer. At this stage, the card
might be a blank card under default ownership. The default
ownership means that its under the ownership of the respective
card manufacturer. The cardholder initiates the ownership
transfer to him or herself and then can present this card
to a SP to request their application. The SP would decide
the lease of the application depending upon their Application
Lease Policy (ALP) [24] which basically states the minimum
security and operation requirements a smart card has to meet
to get the lease. Only after the smart card satisfies the lease
requirement of the respective SP [12, 25], the application can
be downloaded onto it. The cardholder is not involved in this
process except for initiating the request for the application
lease.
B. Why User Centric Smart Card Ownership?
The UCOM architecture is different then the Open Card
initiative [5], multi-functional smart card [26] or virtual smart
cards (applications) [27]. The UCOM is in fact an ownership
model rather then a complete platform or smart card operating
system. To support UCOM requirements and services [8], the
existing well-defined and studied architectures (e.g. Java Card
[17], Multos [28], and GlobalPlatform [16]) are being modified
[29] so they can efficiently support the user’s ownership.
Therefore, the main ingredients to support a user’s ownership
is a secure, reliable, flexible and ubiquitous way is already
there. The only thing UCOM has done is to bring them to-
gether to support the concept of user’s owned security devices
(namely smart cards or secure element). The argument that an
SP has to trust a cardholder before issuing its application is not
valid [12] as the application lease is under sole discretion of
the respective SP. In addition, only after gaining the assurance
and validation that the smart card in questions supports its
requirements that it will lease the application [25]. Therefore,
the SP has to establish trust in the user’s smart card and not
the user. The assumption in the UCOM is that a user can have
malicious intend and under these circumstances how the whole
framework can be secure and reliable.
A valid argument can be made that the UCOM architecture
could only bring more complexity or complicate the security
sensitive smart card industry. It is true that the modification
required by UCOM do require some modification to the
existing smart card platform but not to the service architecture
(i.e. ATMs in banking ,or turnstile terminal for transport
services) than the TSM architecture. In addition, as we will see
in next section that underestimating the desire of the customers
to have a choice might result in market segregation, decrease
revenue generation, low customer satisfaction, and possibly
another failure of multi-application smart card initiative.
V. BUILDING THE BRIDGES
The mobile phone platform has come a long way from just a
medium of voice communication. It has developed into a social
construct that has affiliations and emotional attachment with
individual users [30]. It has become an entertainment hub, and
a medium to connect with the rest of the word through social
media sites. With ever increasing trend of convergence of
different technologies onto a smart phone, the most desirable
avenue for the revival of the multi-application smart cards
was no-doubt on a mobile phone. The NFC technology has
provided that opportunity to harness potentials of collaborative
schemes that will see the deployment of multi-applications
from diverse service providers on to a single mobile phone.
For any new bold step, there has to be forces that moves the
competition in an industry. The pivotal forces in any market
can be categories as: a) threat of new entrants, b) threat of
substitute products/devices and c) consumers power (culture)
[31]. Possible new entrants to the business hierarchy can either
be based on revolutionary product, core competence, or estab-
lish and trusted brand. The smart card industry has not decided
on the who should be taking the role of the TSM. Possible
contenders can be smart card manufacturers, MNOs, CIBs,
mobile phone manufacturers or independent/trusted third party
(i.e. post office). Therefore, there is a possibility that new
entrants may gain ground whose core competence is based
on the multi-application smart cards and in this scenario card
and phone manufacturers can be have an advantage. However,
in term of trust in a technology smart card manufacturer
are worse effected as for the entire period of smart card
deployment their brand is never part of the final product.
Therefore, even the core competence of MNOs or CIBs is not
designing and managing the smart card but they have strong
brand existing customer base.
In addition to this, with recent “App Culture” as prompted
by the iPhone in which a user can download any application
as they desire with easy from the Apple App Store [20]. New
ideas are being circulated and test, for example Starbucks’
customers can pay for coffee using their Starbucks Card
Mobile App on their iPhones. This payment scheme does
not use NFC technology, infact rely on the barcode scheme.
This clearly gives an indication that their can be substitute
technologies that can enter the traditional smart card industry.
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Figure 2. Trusted Service Manager Architecture
May be not as MNOs or CIBs but for other services like
royalty card, travel, and mobile payments.
Furthermore, from a general user’s perspective how they
will measure the multi-application smart card role out. Theo-
retically, consumers compare new technology to the ones they
already use or know off [32]–[34]. As the analysis performed
on mobile phone users showed that they tend to compare
services provided on the mobile phone with one available on
their computers [35]. Although this result does not directly
links to over point of focus, but its shows that any multi-
application smart card architecture might be compared with
the “App Culture”. Authors at the time of writing the paper are
not aware of any study conducted that shows that user would
like or not prefer the same level of freedom of application
choice for a NFC based services roll-out.
Therefore, as noted above the time is right for the stack-
holders in the smart card industry to forge new alliances and
develop innovative ideas for multi-application smart card roll-
out. Now looking at the TSM architecture in its most simplistic
form as illustrated in figure 2. Diverse set of companies would
join together to roll-out the TSM based multi-application smart
card scheme. In such an environment, a customer of MNO1
(e.g. CA) that has a relationship with TSM-1 would only
be able to have applications from CIB1, TSO1 and leisure
centre that are associated with the TSM-1. However, if the
respective customer do banking with a CIB2 that is associated
with the TSM-2 then either she has to acquire a smart card
from one of associates of TSM-2 or change the bank. Such a
scheme has a potential of creating segmentation in the market.
Where to fully benefit from the multi-application smart card
functionality you have to be customer for a set of companies
that are associated with the same TSM.
There are few possibilities to reduce this segmentations.
First possible option is that each participant or application
providers (i.e. CIBs, MNOs and TSOs etc.) maintain relation-
ship with all or most of the TSMs. For example in figure
2 a CIB of TSM-1 should also have a relationship with
the TSM-2, so that customer based managed by the TSM-
2 could also take advantage of services provided by the CIB
of TSM-1. In second possible scenario, all TSMs should have
a inter-relationship mean that they create a syndicated TSM
architecture. So any application provider affiliated with one
TSM would be able to issue its application to a customer of
any other TSM. This in-fact boils down to creating another
syndicated scheme which can be termed as TSM of TSMs in
which several TSM participates to provides services to other
TSMs. Both of these scenarios can be argued to be workable,
but they have suffer from limited scalability, true flexibility
and ubiquitousness of the framework.
The limited scalability roots from the fact: a) not all ap-
plications providers can establish or manage relationship with
every possible TSM and b) there is a possibility that even with
syndicated TSM architecture certain group of TSM end up
having separate scheme where other group of TSM have their
separate syndicated TSM architecture. In addition, a customer
can only have an application from the a application provider
which is associated with one of the TSMs. Now, to be part of
a scheme offered by a TSM might require subscription fee for
the application provider. Therefore, in such a situations small
or medium scale organisations like local libraries, universities
and health centres may not be able to afford to be part of such
scheme.
We consider that such a barrier to enter the multi-application
scheme reduces its flexibility to provide diverse services to
general public. Furthermore, different countries might opt
for having their own independent TSMs thus for a person
travelling from one country to another face the difficulty to
acquiring the applications which she may need to use during
her stay (i.e. application from TSO of the visiting country).
These issues are just on top of the ones that are discussed in [4,
8, 14, 36]: including ownership privileges, customer loyalty,
customer relationship management, smart card marketing and
revenue generation potential; so instead of reducing the issues
the TSM architecture can be argued to increased it.
An argument can be made that none of the issues that
are listed before have real significance. As even if there are
multiple independent and isolated TSMs market competition
will reduce the number by the process of elimination and
only the best/strongest alliance will survive [37]. Thus market
will self regulate itself and reduce the segmentation. Have
competition among a large set of stack-holders (i.e. MNOs,
CIBs, TSOs, card and phone manufacturers, and neutral third
party etc.) will only reduce the profitability of the scheme
as illustrated by the advantages that the smart card industry
have achieve in past through coopetitive strategies [3]. In
addition, modern high-tech industry’s business strategy is
inclined towards cooperation to create a market for emerging
technologies and then compete to harness maximum profit out
of this new found market; which is in other words the coopet-
itive strategy [13, 38, 39]. Furthermore, consumers tend to
weight different schemes as whether they would be temporary
or something long term; along with factors including coolness
(enjoyment of use) and usefulness in daily life [40]–[43].
Therefore, their is a possibility that due to intense competition
among different stack-holders in the smart card industry the
adoption/acceptance of NFC based services on a mobile phone
would be rapid and widespread.
In case of the UCOM architecture, most of the issues
discussed until now are not present [8]. Nevertheless, the main
issue is that the potential for the revenue generation is limited.
As the UCOM smart cards are sold to the cardholders and
after this the card manufacturer or any third party cannot be
part of the value chain. We consider that UCOM architecture
itself would be a suitable solution but it is difficult to assume
that such a model can have a widespread acceptance in
the business community. Therefore, a compromise between
flexible, open, dynamic, and business viable solution combine
the TSM and UCOM architectures: coopetitive architecture
for multi-application smart cards. The coopetitive architecture
focuses on the core competences of individual companies and
leave other areas to organisations that might have expertise in
that particular area. For example, a MNO in the coopetitive
architecture can be a TSM and even have the ability to form
alliance with other companies to provide their services on to
the respective smart cards. But in addition, it also enables the
users to directly request download of any application they like
from any of the application provider of their choice. The main
stack the MNO has is to generate maximum revenue out of
their investment in the secure element and its security. So there
is a way in which an application can be securely download
onto a smart card that does not have any prior relationship
with the particular TSM (i.e. in our example the MNO) and
the MNO charges the customer for acquiring the application.
Then in such a model there is a probability that customers
would actually enable the TSM in the coopetitive architecture
to generate higher revenue then in the traditional architecture.
We discuss the details of the coopetitive architecture in next
section.
VI. COOPETITIVE SMART CARD ARCHITECTURE
The coopetitive smart card architecture basically joins the
business attractions of TSM architecture with the openness,
scalability and flexibility of the UCOM architecture. In this
architecture, users get their choice of selecting which appli-
cation they want on their smart cards, and card issuers have
a permanent presence on the cards along with being part of
the revenue loop. In this section, first we will discuss the
coopetitive architecture and then describe the multi-application
smart card architecture to support it.
A. Coopetitive Architecture for Smart Cards
The ecosystem of a coopetitive architecture is illustrated in
the figure 3, and at its centre there are three main entities;
smart card issuer, cardholder and smart card. The card issuer
(or TSM) would issue the smart cards to their respective
customers. As a card issuer they would have their application
pre-installed on to the smart card. The cardholder would have
the choice to install or delete any application they would
require; except for the card issuer’s application(s). The man-
agement of the smart card application installation, deletion,
and application/card lifecyle management is handled by the
Platform Manager (PM). It facilitates both the card issuer and
the cardholder to perform their sanctioned tasks.
As an example, consider a scenario in which a user en-
rols into the multi-application smart card service architecture
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Figure 3. Coopetitive Architecture’s Smart Card Ecosystem
through a MNO. As the customer of the MNO, the user can
receive a NFC enabled mobile phone (under a fixed period
contract) and secure element(s) that support multi-application
architecture. As par current architecture, MNOs subsidies the
mobile phone in return for a fixed period contract with their
customers. The phone is under MNO lock and it can only be
used on the issuing MNO’s network. At the end of the contract,
the customer can request the respective MNO to unlock the
mobile phone. The acquired secure element(s) would have
MNO’s application installed by default. In addition, if the
user is customer of any other organisations that are associated
partner with the MNO in the TSM scheme. Then she may
get their applications pre-installed on the secure element.
The issuer secure element would enable the user to request
installation or deletion of any application she requires, except
for the MNO’s application. At the end of the contract the MNO
would not only unlock the mobile phone but also the TSM.
From this point forward, the user can either use the secure
element under UCOM architecture or register their secure
element with any other TSM (or continue with the original
MNO).
Similarly, other entities like CIBs, TSOs, smart card and
mobile phone manufacturers, or independent third parties can
participate by offering competitive products that adhere to
the coopetitive architecture. The security and reliability of
the coopetitive smart cards would be a key issue which is
dealt with separately in the ICOM and UCOM scenarios.
However, we consider that further work would only strength
the contribution that an open and dynamic system can bring
to the multi-application smart card architecture.
Before we discuss the smart card architecture that would
support the coopetitive lifecycle; we list the fundamental
attributes of the coopetitive architecture for multi-application
smart cards.
1) The scheme manager (TSM) would enable the provision
for the cardholders to request installation or deletion of
any application as they require.
2) To provide privacy to the cardholders, the applications
that they request to install or delete would not be revealed
to the respective TSM. Unless the application in question
is from an associate of the TSM. In that case the TSM
would be notified of installation and deletion. For any
independent entity (not related to the respective TSM),
the identity of the application would be revealed to the
TSM.
3) The security and reliability of the platform has to be
decentralised. In scenarios where a cardholder does not
want to reveal who is the active TSM of the card. The
respective smart card would still be able to provide
security assurance and validations in a unlink-able way.
The unlink-ability relates to the mechanism that does
not rely on the TSM, but on the independent third
party’s evaluation (i.e. Common Criteria Evaluations [12,
25, 44]). The property of the unlink-ability would be
that application providers that does not belong to the
respective TSM will not know whether the requesting
user with with a particular TSM or not. Similarly, the
respective TSM should not know whose application is
being requested to be installed or deleted from the secure
element.
4) The cardholder should be given the choice to change the
TSM if they require after meeting terms and conditions
of the original TSM. This would enable the cardholders
to move the TSMs that they consider provide them best
service. Obviously, the original TSM has made invest-
ment in the platform that is issued to the cardholder.
Therefore, cardholder would have to honour any terms
and conditions that she agreed at the time of acquiring
the secure element.
5) If a cardholder does not want to be with any of the TSM,
then the framework should move back to default UCOM
architectures. Similarly, the TSMs would also have the
choice to remove the privileges of a cardholder to install
or delete applications; if it does not conforms with the
TSM’s terms and conditions.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we started the discussion on the reasons behind
why the multi-application smart card initiative failed in 1990s.
Most of the reasons behind this lack of adoption was due
to business issues that were closely related to the smart card
ownership model. However, Near Field Communication (NFC)
technology has reinvigorated the multi-application smart card
initiative — the smart car ownership model is still adheres of
the ICOM. We consider that the TSM model has potential but
there are scalability and market segmentation issues that may
hinder its adoption. The UCOM on other hand breaks away
from all traditional notion of smart card ownership model but
it might not gain wide spread acceptance in the smart card
industry. Joining the TSM and UCOM into the coopetitive
architecture delivers the benefits of the both models, along
with satisfying their unique requirements.
This paper provides the ground work for the coopetitive
architecture, and as part of our future research directions we
would like to explore the effect of coopetitive architecture on
the individual operations, security, privacy and reliability of the
smart cards. This includes looking the runtime environment,
spaces and domain management, inter-application communi-
cation, security attestation based on PUF and common criteria,
application management that includes application installation,
and deletion — to name a few.
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